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Abstract
This article focuses on the problem of the authenticity of knowledge.  It argues 
that the failure to integrate the observer into the act of observing is the main source of the 
disagreements and divisions in contemporary science and scholarship.  The article uses 
the quantum debate as a case study to illustrate this point.  It also argues that a truly non-
classical epistemology should abandon the traditional subject-object orientation and focus 
on the very process of construction which creates both the subject and the object.  The 
understanding of this process in terms of the equilibrium between equilibrium and 
disequilibrium will be critical for such epistemological perspective.  The article 
concludes with some illustrations that show how the new perspective can help resolve the 
paradoxes which plague contemporary knowledge.
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Authenticity of knowledge has been one of the most hotly debated problems in 
Western intellectual tradition throughout its history.  The controversy, or rather multiple 
controversies, over the status of knowledge vis-à-vis reality go as far back as the 
Antiquity.  They became particularly intense during the modern period.  Kant’s critique 
of the Enlightenment radically departed from the classical epistemology.  Kant 
emphasized the constructed nature of knowledge and the role of human agency in 
knowledge production.  His re-examination of the classical tradition led the way to a 
2broad search for a non-classical epistemology that would integrate the new awareness and 
sensibilities.  
Although this search has been going on for well over two centuries, no consensus 
seems to be emerging.  On the contrary, debates over the status of knowledge have 
become increasingly more intense.  Multiple sources generated this concern.  It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to attempt a comprehensive historical account of its emergence 
and evolution.  Suffice it to say that this increased concern about the status of knowledge 
reflects the growing awareness of autonomy and agency that has been broadly 
characteristic of the cultural climate that developed during the modern period, and 
particularly after the Second World War.1  This awareness, more than anything else,
catalyzed the debates over the status of knowledge.
These debates were part and parcel of practically every major development in 
Western thought during the 20th century.  They accompanied the emergence of modern 
science and particularly quantum physics, were involved in the development of modern 
philosophical perspectives (such as post-structuralism and post-modernism), shaped new 
approaches in the study of our past (for example, the new historicism), brought 
innovations in literary criticism, and inspired, more recently, feminist and post-colonial 
critiques.
The intellectual perspectives that have transpired in these debates are very 
diverse.  It would certainly be an oversimplification to reduce the entire array of unique 
and original contributions to a limited number of archetypal categories, such as 
representationalists and anti-representationalists or realists and anti-realists.  The majority 
of contributors fall between such extremes.  However, the fact that moderate perspectives 
3in these debates exceed radical ones has had little effect on the intensity of the 
controversy.  On the contrary, if anything, this intensity has increased, rather than 
subsided, as reputations continue to be created and destroyed, and the paradoxes 
generated in these debates continue to multiply.  Moreover, there is hardly any sign that 
the controversy will be resolved any time soon.  Its sustained nature indicates that 
cognitive disequilibria at the root of the divisions still endure and have yet to be 
addressed.
The current direction of these debates which focus on whether our knowledge 
corresponds to anything out there does not appear to be very constructive.2  Even anti-
representationalists agree that there are many instances in our experience when we do get 
things right and attain reliable knowledge that corresponds to the real world in which we 
live and function.  So the question is not whether we can get things right, but rather how 
we get things right.  How do we construct knowledge?  What makes our knowledge 
reliable?  Can we control knowledge production and make it more efficient?
Contemporary debates over these issues appear to be at an impasse and a genuine 
non-classical epistemology seems to be as distant a goal today as it was in Kant’s 
lifetime. It is obvious that a resolution of the controversy and the construction of a 
genuine non-classical epistemology are not possible without a clear understanding of 
what produces this conundrum.  This paper will explain the source of the controversy and 
sketch an outline of a non-classical epistemology.
The Quantum Controversy
4There is hardly a case more suitable for an analysis of the controversy about 
authenticity of knowledge than the famous debate that took place over seventy years ago 
between Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr.  Much has been written about this debate, which 
arguably was one of the most important and much discussed events in twentieth century 
physics.  There is no need to add another detailed account to the host of excellent studies 
that have appeared over the years on the subject.  A brief overview of the debate, 
however, may be in order.
The debate began in the late 1920s in the wake of the “second quantum 
revolution” when the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory was 
formulated by its main proponents, among whom Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg 
were the most prominent contributors.3  Einstein was certainly the most visible and 
celebrated figure among the critics of this interpretation. He and his supporters pursued 
several approaches in their criticism.  They charged, for example, that quantum theory 
did not cover individual systems.  Rather, they contended, it described the aggregate 
behavior of multiple systems, and not specific real situations.  As Einstein put it in one of 
his contributions to this debate:
What does not satisfy me in that theory, from the standpoint of principle, 
is its attitude toward that which appears to me to be the programmatic aim 
of all physics:  the complete description of any (individual) real situation 
(as it supposedly exists irrespective of any act of observation or 
substantiation).4
Another line of criticism pursued by Einstein was to challenge the principle of 
complementarity.  According to this principle, as articulated by Bohr, evidence obtained 
under different and mutually exclusive experimental conditions “cannot be 
comprehended within a single picture, but must be regarded as complementary. . . .”5
5Einstein devised an ingenious experiment that became known as the photon-in-the-box 
experiment to provide an example which would demonstrate a possibility of measuring 
with arbitrary precision two complementary quantities, regarded as non-commuting, at 
the same time and thus disprove one of the fundamental principles of quantum theory.6
Still another important line of criticism—one that eventually appeared in the 
paper published in 1935 jointly by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen—alleged that the 
Copenhagen interpretation was inconsistent.7  Einstein found it paradoxical that the 
measurement on one of the particles, which had been in contact and then became 
separated, would still affect the measurement of another particle—what Einstein called 
the “spooky action at a distance.”  Although Einstein repudiated the EPR paper soon after 
its publication,8 he nevertheless continued to insist that “[t]he assertion that, in this latter 
case [i.e. separated systems], the real situation of B could not be (directly) influenced by 
any measurement taken on A is, therefore, within the framework of quantum theory 
unfounded and (as the paradox shows) unacceptable.”9  In a letter to Rosenfeld, Einstein 
asked, largely rhetorically:  “How can the final state of the second particle be influenced 
by a measurement performed on the first, after all physical interaction has ceased 
between them?”10
All these specific criticisms converged on one major point that quantum theory 
did not provide a complete description of the microscopic processes and that physicists 
should continue searching for a more comprehensive approach.
The intense criticisms left the Copenhageners unimpressed.  In response to 
charges that quantum theory refused to deal with individual phenomena but only with 
aggregates, Bohr argued that quantum theory had a very different conception of 
6individuality than did classical physics.  “In fact,” he wrote, “. . . in quantum physics we 
are presented . . . with the inability of the classical frame of concepts to comprise the 
peculiar feature of indivisibility, or ‘individuality,’ characterizing the elementary 
processes.”11  In his view, “the quantum postulate requires that ‘interactions’ between 
‘systems’ be accorded the feature of ‘wholeness’ or ‘individuality.’”12 Bohr also 
countered Einstein’s ingenious photon-in-the-box experiment with his own 
interpretations of this experiment, invoking Einstein’s own theory of relativity to show 
that the experiment did not violate the principle of complementarity,13 and moreover, it 
was well “suited to embrace the characteristic features of individuality of quantum 
phenomena.”14  The Copenhageners also did not appear to be perturbed by the paradoxes 
highlighted in the EPR paper.  In fact, they did not see much new in this article that had 
not been addressed and explained by them prior to the paper’s publication.15  Bohr, for 
example, saw the argumentation advanced in the article as ill suited “to affect the 
soundness of quantum-mechanical description, which is based on a coherent 
mathematical formalism covering automatically any procedure of measurement like that 
indicated [in the article].”16
Although by the end of the 1930s the debate seemed to have passed its peak, 
Einstein persisted in his attempts to reason with his opponents.  After failing to win the 
battle, Einstein tried to make a compromise.  While granting that “the (testable) relations 
which are contained in it [quantum theory] are, within the natural limits fixed by the 
indeterminacy relations, complete,”17 he argued that there was no ground, either 
theoretical or empirical, to consider any theory as a complete description of physical 
reality.  He even conceded the incompleteness of his own theory of relativity, recognizing 
7that “the general theory of relativity furnished . . . a field theory of gravitation, but no 
theory of the field-creating masses.”18  But all these efforts were to no avail.  Bohr and 
his supporters remained unwavering in their stance and continued to gain new supporters 
for their orthodoxy.  Bohr managed to create a numerous cohort of loyal followers who 
revered him as a demi-god,19 in part because of his remarkable achievements in physics 
but also, as Gell-Mann has observed, because he “brainwashed a whole generation of 
theorists into thinking that the job [an authentic and complete explanation of physical
reality] was done fifty years ago.”20
This visceral confrontation was not a mere clash of personalities or a competition 
for power—although there was definitely something of both in it.  One can explain its 
character by the fact that it touched upon some very fundamental problems concerning 
reality and its knowability.  These problems were at the time and continue to be to this 
day central for many physicists, and not only physicists.  For both Einstein and Bohr the 
issues on which they disagreed went to the very core of the meaning of the physical 
world that they constructed.  Einstein wrote in one of his letters to Schrodinger:  “The 
Talmudic philosopher [as he referred to Bohr] doesn’t give a hoot for ‘reality’ which he 
regards as a hobgoblin of the naïve . . . .”21  To the end of his life Einstein remained 
convinced that “. . . to believe that [quantum mechanics is a complete account of reality] 
is logically possible, but it is so very contrary to my scientific instinct that I cannot forego 
the search for a more complete conception.”22
Although the principal contributors to this debate have long been gone, the issues 
raised in this debate continue to be a source of controversy.  As Stent summarized:  “. . . 
among contemporary philosophers of science and philosophically inclined physicists, the 
8basic epistemological problems raised by the photon-in-the-box experiment and the EPR 
argument are not only still hotly debated, but their resolution is not even in sight.23
The Epistemology of the Copenhagen Interpretation
Two important elements are characteristic for the epistemological perspective of 
the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics.  One is a constant introduced by 
Planck—the so-called Plank constant—to describe the size of quanta involved in 
exchange of energy on the subatomic level.  The other is the recognition of the agency of 
the observer.  The combination of these two features constitutes the core the Copenhagen 
interpretation of quantum mechanics.  
The Copenhageners argued that classical physics, which viewed objects as 
systems isolated from external influences, was totally inadequate for studying subatomic 
particles.  Due to the size and uncertainty involved in the behavior of quantum systems—
for example, they could exhibit features of a wave or a particle under different 
experimental conditions—these systems could not be observed in isolation but only in 
interaction with instruments used in the experiment.  The energy in such interactions 
could only be exchanged in fixed amounts called quanta—the smallest indivisible packets 
of energy introduced in modern physics by Max Planck.  Bohr and other Copenhageners 
shared the view that “. . . an independent reality in the ordinary [that is, classical] 
physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agency of 
observation.”24  However, while recognizing the indivisibility and distinctly non-classical 
character of quantum mechanical phenomena, they also stressed that there was no other 
alternative but to describe them in the classical mode, that is, differentiating between the 
9behavior of a quantum mechanical system and the means of observing.  Bohr tells us that 
“. . . it is decisive to recognize that, however, far the phenomena transcend the scope of 
classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must be expressed in classical 
terms.25”
Thus, the epistemological foundation of the Copenhagen interpretation of 
quantum mechanics included both non-classical and classical components. One 
interesting consequence of this peculiar combination of a classical perspective, which 
postulated a gap between the subject and the object, and a non-classical approach, with its 
recognition of the agency of the observer, was that in the final analysis the 
epistemological perspective of quantum mechanics preserved classical dualism.  One can 
certainly agree with Stapp who characterized the epistemology of the Copenhagen 
interpretation as a “hybrid” and a “half-way house”26:  while it recognized the agency of 
the observer, it also preserved the gap between the observer and the observed.
The Copenhageners justified this division, which became known as the 
“Heisenberg cut,” primarily by instrumental pragmatic considerations.  While quantum 
mechanical processes involve uncertainty and ambiguity, the results must be presented 
unambiguously.  Such unambiguous presentation requires that the object of observation 
be clearly differentiated from the observing instruments.  But how can one achieve such 
differentiation given the quantum postulate?  The answer of the Copenhageners was:  by 
providing a description of the conditions of the experiment in terms of classical physics 
with its sharp differentiation between the subject and the object. As Bohr explained:
The argument is simply that by the word experiment we refer to a situation 
where we can tell others what we have done and what we have learned and 
that, therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and of the 
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results of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous language 
with suitable application of the terminology of classical physics.27
Elsewhere Bohr further elucidated:
All description of experience so far has been based on the assumption, 
already inherent in ordinary conventions of language, that it is possible to 
distinguish sharply between the behaviour of the objects and the means of 
observation.  This assumption is not only fully justified by everyday 
experience, but even constitutes the whole basis of classical physics.28
Some researchers, as for example, Landsman, see in these pragmatic justifications 
a keen concern for the objectivity of physics which calls for unambiguous descriptions:
It is precisely the objectivity of classical physics in this sense that 
guarantees the possibility of what Bohr calls “unambiguous 
communication” between observing subjects, provided this 
communication is performed in “classical terms.”29
Others explain them as a mere inertia on the part of the Copenhageners that prevented 
them from completely abandoning classical conceptions.  Stapp concludes:
The Copenhagen version of quantum theory is thus a hybrid of the old 
familiar classical theory, which physicists were understandably reluctant 
to abandon completely, and a totally new theory based on radically 
different concepts.30
Notwithstanding the pragmatic justifications enunciated by the framers of 
quantum theory, there are some indications that the reasons for the preservation of 
classical dualism go much deeper.  Interaction between subatomic particles was the main 
focus of quantum theory.  Bohr, Heisenberg, Pauli and others theorized this interaction in 
terms of energy exchange.  The exchange of energy, according to quantum theory, is not 
a continuous process; it occurs, as Planck established, in the smallest fixed packets of 
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energy called quanta or, as Bohr often called them, quanta of action.  In his explanation 
of the connection between Planck’s discovery and quantum theory, Bohr wrote:
From the very beginning the main point under debate [with Einstein] has 
been the attitude to take to the departure from customary principles of 
natural philosophy characteristic of the novel development of physics 
which was initiated in the first year of this century by Planck’s discovery 
of the universal quantum of action.  This discovery, which revealed a 
feature of atomicity in the laws of nature going far beyond the old doctrine 
of the limited divisibility of matter, has indeed taught us that the classical 
theories of physics are idealizations which can be unambiguously applied 
only in the limit where all actions involved are large compared with the 
quantum.31
The distinct feature of the quantum of action is its indivisibility:  we cannot 
differentiate independent behavior of a quantum system when it interacts with another 
quantum system or with a measuring device.  “. . .  [I]n quantum physics,” Bohr tells us, 
“we are presented  . . . with the inability of the classical frame of concepts to comprise 
the peculiar feature of indivisibility, or ‘individuality,’ characterizing the elementary 
processes.”32  A crucial implication of the principle of indivisibility is that, in contrast to 
classical physics which claims knowledge of objects as they are, that is, without in any 
way disturbing the system, in quantum mechanics one cannot in principle know anything 
about a quantum system as it is, outside the experiment set up by the observer.  In the 
course of his debates with Einstein, Bohr stresses repeatedly that “. . . in quantum 
mechanics, we are not dealing with an arbitrary renunciation of a more detailed analysis
of atomic phenomena, but with a recognition that such an analysis is in principle
excluded.”33
This and similar statements show that although the immediate preoccupation of 
the Copenhagen interpretation was subatomic particles, its conclusions reached way
beyond physics.  Implicit in this interpretation was a more far ranging philosophical 
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claim about the knowability of reality.  The Copenhageners posited quantum interactions 
as an ontological reality which set the absolute limit to what could be known about 
reality.  It was to the setting of such limitation that Einstein reacted most strongly in his 
contributions to this debate.  One can certainly agree with Landsman who astutely 
observes that “. . . the technical parts of their [Bohr and Einstein] debate on the 
(in)completeness of quantum mechanics just served as a pale reflection of a much deeper 
philosophical disagreement between Bohr and Einstein about the knowability of 
nature.”34
The theory of knowledge that the Copenhageners deployed in their version of 
quantum mechanics is rooted in the atomistic tradition that goes back to Leucippus and 
Democritus.  The main precept of this tradition with its analytical methodology is that 
knowledge can be attained by breaking complex entities into simple ones.  For the 
Copenhageners, quantum theory reached the absolute limit of the atomistic approach in 
studying reality.  It was the end of the line where, in their view, analysis and synthesis 
came together.  Bohr explained: 
The question at issue has been whether the renunciation of a causal model 
of description of atomic processes involved in the endeavours [sic!] to 
cope with the situation should be regarded as a temporary departure from 
ideals to be ultimately revived or whether we are faced with an irrevocable 
step towards obtaining the proper harmony between analysis and synthesis 
of physical phenomena.35
Although theory of knowledge played such an important part in the Copenhagen 
interpretation, its authors did not make an attempt to base it on a more solid foundation 
than their intuitions.  Their contributions to the debate do not contain any critical 
reflections on the theory of knowledge they deployed.  They show no familiarity with 
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both theoretical and empirical studies on how knowledge is constructed, even though 
such studies were available at the time, for example through works of Jean Piaget.36  
Finally, they do not provide any independent justifications for the limits they were setting 
up for human knowledge in their quantum theory.  Bohr, for example, used the principle 
of complementarity which followed from the quantum principle to argue in support of 
setting such limitation:
In fact, the individuality of the typical quantum effects finds its proper 
expression in the circumstance that any attempt of subdividing the 
phenomena will demand a change in the experimental arrangement 
introducing new possibilities of interactions between objects and 
measuring instruments which in principle cannot be controlled.37
In other words, he made a circular argument in which deduction justified the premises 
from which it was made.  This fact did not escape Einstein who, in his “Reply to 
Criticism,” after making a long argument that the statistical quantum theory allowed only 
descriptions of ensembles and not individual systems,38 made an astute remark about
circularity which made “hidden use of the object to be defined.”39
The above shows that the inclusion of the classical component in quantum theory 
was not a mere pragmatic convenience for the Copenhageners.  In formulating their 
theory, they came face to face with the problem of subjectivity and the construction of 
knowledge.  They had no idea how to resolve this problem and they looked away.  Their 
insistence on the classical description of the conditions of an experiment was hardly a 
solution to the problem of subjectivity; it merely shifted this problem to another level.  If 
the idea of quantum mechanics was to recognize subjectivity and thus establish control 
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over it, it certainly failed to achieve this goal:  with the classical description of the 
conditions of an experiment, subjectivity was still on the loose and uncontrolled.
The failure to integrate subjectivity could place in doubt the entire enterprise of 
quantum mechanics to provide an objective description of physical reality.  For the 
Copenhageners, this outcome was certainly unacceptable.  Their way out of this 
predicament was simply to declare the ontological reality of quantum systems 
inaccessible to knowledge, thus in fact reviving the Kantian thing-in-itself but on a new 
foundation and creating a new orthodoxy.
The classical tradition was largely oblivious to the agency of the observer.  
Mental constructions were projected unconsciously and uncritically on reality which was 
regarded as given.40  Dualism was a necessary outcome of this perspective which did not 
recognize a vital and constructive link between the subject and the object.  Obviously, if 
one does not understand the process which constructs both the subject and the object, the 
two appear as ontologically separate.  The classical epistemology allowed only one path 
to knowledge:  more or less passive reflection.
Kant made the first major step in changing the view on the role of the observer.  
However, while recognizing the agency of the observer, he did not see the actual physical 
link that connected the observer and the object.  In his view, knowledge was essentially 
rooted in self-referentiality of the observer whose mental a priori categories mediated 
physical experience.  As a result, observing appeared as an infinite self-referential 
regression and the object as a thing-in-itself which in principle was inaccessible to 
knowledge.
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In contrast to Kant, the Copenhageners saw the actual physical link between the 
subject and the object, but for them this link was nothing more than an undifferentiated 
mystery of the quantum of action.  As a result, the object of quantum reality—the 
quantum system—appeared to them as an inaccessible thing-in-itself, while observing 
became an infinite self-referential introspection.  In his famous statement, Heisenberg 
summarized:
The conception of the objective reality of the elementary particles has thus 
evaporated not into the cloud of some obscure new reality concept, but 
into the transparent clarity of mathematics that represents no longer the 
behavior of the particles but rather our knowledge of this behavior.41
Bohr echoed the same idea when he wrote: “. . . when searching for harmony in life one 
must never forget that in the drama of existence we are ourselves both actors and 
spectators.”42
The implications of self-referentiality in quantum theory could not but cause 
controversy.  As Wiseman cogently observes:
Heisenberg by 1958 had been seduced by the idea that “the discontinuous 
change in our knowledge in the instant of registration . . . has its image in 
the discontinuous change of the probability function [Ψ].”  But he failed to 
take the necessary logical step of accepting that Ψ can represent only one 
individual’s knowledge.43
The subjectification of knowledge by the Copenhageners, as evidenced in the above 
quotes from Heisenberg and Bohr, was fraught with inconsistencies and made quantum 
theory vulnerable to criticism.  In order to protect the new orthodoxy, the Copenhageners 
had to build defenses from both internal instability and external criticisms.  In an effort to 
forestall possible fragmentations, Bohr resorted to policing the language used in quantum 
mechanical descriptions.  As he described himself:    
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. . . I warned especially against phrases, often found in the physical 
literature, such as “disturbing of phenomena by observation” or “creating 
physical attributes to atomic objects by measurements.”  Such phrases, 
which may serve to remind of the apparent paradoxes in quantum theory, 
are at the same time apt to cause confusion, since words like “phenomena” 
and “observations,” just as “attributes” and “measurements,” are used in a 
way hardly compatible with common language and practical definition.44
It is not surprising that in the charged atmosphere of the acrimonious debate, the search 
for knowledge turned, as many have agreed since, into an exercise of power.45  Some
historians of science even see Bohr as a Stalin46 who managed to suppress the opposition 
through “a combination of political maneuvering, shrewd rhetoric, and spellbinding his 
colleagues and the general audience by the allegedly unfathomable depth of his thoughts . 
. . .”47  Gell-Mann characterizes the advocacy of their doctrine by the Copenhageners as 
nothing short of “brainwashing.”48
Einstein’s position in this debate was also perturbed by classical dualism.  In his 
general and special theory of relativity, Einstein pioneered the modern view which also 
emphasized the agency of the observer.  In his theoretical perspective, observations also 
depend on the frame of reference chosen by the observer.  Just like the Copenhageners, 
Einstein also did not follow through on his innovation:  the interaction between subject 
and object remained, for Einstein, also a mystery.  As a result, his innovative theories, 
just like quantum mechanics, conserved classical dualism.  For example, one of the main 
principles of Einstein’s epistemology was Trennungsprinzip (separability principle).  Don 
Howard explains that “Einstein regarded his separation principle . . . as virtually an 
axiom for any future fundamental physics.”49  He invoked this principle in his critique of 
Bohr’s complementarity and sustained a profound lifelong philosophical commitment to 
it, which explains his enduring uneasiness about quantum mechanics.   
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Einstein’s insistence on Trennungprinzip was based on a belief that an assumption 
about independent existence of physical systems in space and time was absolutely 
essential in studying physical reality.  As he explained in his letter to Born:
. . . if one renounces the assumption that what is present in different parts 
of space has an independent, real existence, then I do not at all see what 
physics is supposed to describe.  For what is thought to be a “system” is, 
after all, just conventional, and I do not see how one is supposed to divide 
up the world objectively so that one can make statements about the parts.50
According to Don Howard, Einstein’s enduring commitment to the separability 
principle reflects his early interest in the philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer, whom 
Einstein read at the Zurich Polytechnic.  Schopenhauer’s principium individuationis, 
conditioned by space and time, led Einstein to conclude that the difference in location of 
any two systems was sufficient for regarding physical systems as independent of each 
other.  By the same analogy, he also regarded the subject and the object as two separate 
systems which existed in space and time.  In Einstein’s own words, “the belief in the 
external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis of all natural sciences.”51
Thus Einstein’s conception of subject-object relations was not significantly 
different from that of the Copenhageners.  In fact, although Einstein was not as steeped in 
the Kantian tradition as the latter were, he acknowledged some fundamental similarities 
between his views and Kant’s philosophy.  Just like Kant, he recognized the fundamental 
gap separating the thing-in-itself from the observer.  The only difference that he saw 
between himself and Kant in this respect was that, in contrast to Kant, he did not regard 
cognitive categories (which, in Kant’s view, were essential for constructing knowledge 
about reality) as immutable a priori ideas, but rather as free and changeable conventions.  
In his own explanation of his theoretical perspective, Einstein wrote:
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The theoretical attitude here advocated is distinct from that of Kant only 
by the fact that we do not conceive of the “categories” as unalterable 
(conditioned by the nature of the understanding) but as (in the logical 
sense) free conventions.  They appear to be a priori only insofar as 
thinking without the positing of categories and of concepts in general 
would be as impossible as is breathing in a vacuum.52
Contrary to the criticism for allegedly adhering to the classical tradition directed against 
him by the Copenhageners, his idea of the real was not that much different from their 
thing-in-itself.  Again, in Einstein’s own words:
I did not grow up in the Kantian tradition, but came to understand the truly 
valuable which is to be found in his doctrine, alongside of errors which 
today are quite obvious, only quite late.  It is contained in the sentence:  
“The real is not given to us, but put to us (aufgegeben) (by way of 
riddle).”  This obviously means:  There is such a thing as a conceptual 
construction for the grasping of the inter-personal, the authority of which 
lies purely in its validation.  This conceptual construction refers precisely 
to the “real” (by definition), and every further question concerning the 
“nature of the real” appears empty.53
Einstein’s advocacy of the “real” in his debates with Bohr was not due to the alleged 
classical prejudices, but rather, as in the case of the Copenhageners, it appears to be a 
manifestation of perturbations in his own theoretical perspective.  The Copenhageners’ 
projected on Einstein the classicism which was the source of instability and paradoxes in 
quantum mechanics, and Einstein projected on them his own demon—a concern about 
the status of the “real” which perturbed his own theoretical perspective.  
Thus the source of one of the most important controversies in modern physics was 
the failure of both sides in the debate to build up on their innovations and create a 
consistent non-classical epistemology which would fully integrate the agency of the 
observer—arguably their biggest theoretical innovation.  As a result, the symbolic 
systems that they constructed experienced internal perturbation.  Rather than address the 
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true source of these perturbations, both sides tried to alleviate the anxiety caused by the 
instabilities in their own theoretical perspective by projecting the source of the 
perturbation on the opponent.  In their criticism, Bohr and the Copenhageners, who 
included a classical component in their own theory, tried to represent Einstein’s position 
as “rigid adherence to classical theory,” which completely disregarded very significant 
non-classical aspects of Einstein’s theoretical heritage.  Likewise, Einstein, whose own 
theoretical contributions brought forth the specter of subjectivity and self-referentiality, 
tended in his criticism to reduce the position of the Copenhageners to “anti-realism,” 
which hardly reflected the complex character of quantum theory.  
Toward a Non-Classical Epistemology
The debate between Einstein and the Copenhageners in many ways prefigured 
contemporary clashes between “realists” and “anti-realists” or “representationalists” and 
“anti-representationalists.”  The persistence of these and similar polarizations indicates 
that those involved in these debates are not critically addressing the real source of the 
controversy.  As the above discussion suggests, there is only one way to resolve these 
disagreements and move forward:  the construction of a genuine non-classical 
epistemology.  But what features would characterize such epistemology?  What will it 
look like?
The quantum debate was not an isolated phenomenon. What transpired in this 
debate was not related merely to physics or even science in general.  The quantum 
controversy was an integral part of the overall evolution of Western thought and culture.  
The issues confronted by Einstein and the Copenhageners reflect the general trends of 
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this evolution which supports the conclusions one can draw from this confrontation.  In 
light of this evolution, the quantum debate, and the subsequent developments in physics, 
it is hard to imagine a new epistemology that would not recognize the agency of the 
knower.  The recognition of agency inevitably involves the acceptance of the notion of 
the constructed nature of knowledge.  Finally, as the analysis of the debate suggests, in 
order to resolve the paradoxes generated by the recognition of the agency of the observer, 
we must depart from classical dualism with its radical separation of the subject from the 
object.  The only way out of the conundrum generated in the debate is to focus on the 
very process of construction which generates both the subject and the object.
Since the pioneering work of Jean Piaget on the construction of knowledge shifted 
the center of attention from the subject and the object to the process of construction,54 a 
growing number of disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches now focus on the 
process of construction.  They include systems theory, communication theory, theory of 
emergence, constructionism, chaos theory, complexity theory, theory of autopoiesis, as 
well as more disciplinary fields such as evolutionary and developmental psychology, 
evolutionary and developmental biology, economics, management science, and others.  
Although there is still much to understand about the process of construction, several 
important features of this process can already be outlined.
As Piaget has shown, the process of construction involves operations which 
represent closed loops of action centered on their own functioning.  Reflex is one 
example of such operation.  In prehension, for instance, a neural signal and muscle 
contractions form such closed operational loop.  The same loop is present in gustatory 
functions.55  The very functioning of these operations conserves them.  The more they 
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function, the more they conserve themselves.  Thus conservation is the most basic feature 
of the process of construction.
The functioning of operations requires stimulation.  Something should activate the 
operation, trigger it into action.  The triggering of the functional operation is obviously 
also an operation.  Its function is to detect stimuli and send a signal that activates the 
main operation.  It regulates the functional operation and helps to conserve it.  Thus 
regulation is another important feature involved in the process of construction.  The 
process of construction would be impossible without this vital combination of 
conservation and regulation.  
Since the regulatory operation activates the main functional operation by reacting 
to external stimuli, it is capable of coupling the operation it regulates to other operations.  
The coupling brings individual operations into equilibrium with each other.  The 
combination of operations is certainly more powerful than each individual operation in 
the coupling because it has a greater combinatorial power and can respond to a larger
number of stimuli.  For example, the combination of visual and auditory functions is 
activated by both visual and auditory stimuli.  When infants combine these functions, 
they begin to see when they hear and hear when they see.56  In this case, each function is 
stimulated not only by stimuli with which it is directly associated but also by those 
associated with the other function; each function is activated more often and therefore 
better conserved.
A coupling of operations has a much greater combinatorial power than each 
individual operation involved in it.  A combination of operations is capable of 
functioning in an environment which is much richer than the one in which each of them 
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functioned prior to their coupling.  Individual operations retain their identity while 
conserved in the coupling.  The interaction with a new and richer environment leads to a 
differentiation and the emergence of a variety of new derivatives of the coupling.  Their 
conservation requires equilibration and results in the creation of progressively more 
powerful structures which include many more operational possibilities.  A simple 
example illustrates this point.  Two separate operations A and B have only two 
possibilities each:  A and not-A, and B and not-B, for a total of four operations.  The 
combination of these operations offers sixteen possibilities.  With further equilibration of 
these derivatives, the number of possibilities increases exponentially to 256.
As one can see from the above description, there are two other features that define 
the process of construction.  Conservation of operations requires their equilibration.  This 
progressive equilibration creates more complex combinations and, as a result, a 
commensurate growth in disequilibrium.  Thus the progressive construction of more 
complex operations is characterized by a balance between equilibrium and 
disequilibrium.57
The process of construction is also characterized by emergence and downward 
causality.  In the current literature, emergence is defined as the appearance of new 
totalities which cannot be reduced to a mere sum of its components.  Indeed, the 
combination of operations offers much broader constructive possibilities.  It is more 
powerful than the mere agglomeration of the individual operations which compose it; it is 
a new and much richer totality.   It is worth noting that in this context the familiar 
dualism of continuity and discontinuity cease to be mutually exclusive.  Continuous 
process of equilibration results in what appears to be a discontinuity, or what is often also 
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called “phase transition”--i.e., the creation of totalities qualitatively different from the 
operations which constitute them. 
The term “downward causality” refers to the reversal of the causal sequence as it 
is recognized in the classical epistemology where the cause precedes the effect.  The 
adaptation of the lower level operations to their more powerful combinations is a good 
example of such reversal.  The construction of new combinations and, as a result, new 
environments have a profound effect on the original operations that constituted these 
combinations.  They have to conform to the emerging totality which define them and 
limit their degrees of freedom.  Thus the familiar relationship between cause and effect 
loses its classical linearity as the effect—the new totality—exerts powerful influence on 
its cause.
The above features certainly do not exhaust all there is to know about the process 
of construction.  Much still has to be learned.  As we continue to study the richness of 
structural possibilities at different levels of the organization of reality—from particles 
and atoms to cells and organisms, to symbolic operations and social evolution—we will 
certainly learn more details about the common features of this process which operate on 
all these levels.
The construction of knowledge is intimately related to the general process of 
construction that operates in the evolution of reality; it emerges from this general process.  
The operations that are performed in constructing knowledge are isomorphic to the 
processes that operate in the self-organization of reality.  Therefore, in order to solve the 
problems involved in the creation of a truly non-classical epistemology, what we already 
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know and will learn about the process of construction in general should be incorporated 
into how we know.
The problem of objectivity is one such problem.  It was a major preoccupation at 
the time of the quantum debate and still continues to draw much attention from scientists 
and scholars.58  The classical conception of objectivity revolves around traditional 
dualism with its unbridgeable gap between the subject and the object.  In this conception, 
an objective description is one in which the subject has absolutely no impact on the 
object.  Quantum mechanics challenged this conception by recognizing the need to 
include the observer in the act of observing.  One of the innovations introduced by 
quantum theory was to acknowledge the essential connection between observers and their 
tools, on one hand, and objects, on the other.  However, as a result of the vestigial 
survival of classical dualism in quantum epistemology, the new perspective has not 
resolved the problem of objectivity.  This inconsistency, demonstrated in the above 
analysis of the quantum debate, has resulted in a paradoxical recognition of objects as 
ultimately inaccessible things-in-themselves.
There is a growing realization in the post-quantum world that objectivity requires 
an integration of the observer in the process of observing.  In order to be objective, a
description should involve observing the object and the observer (subject) at the same 
time.  It is important to recognize that a physical system and an observer operate on very 
different levels of the self-organization of reality.  They can be integrated in the same act 
of observing only on the basis of what they have in common.  Otherwise the self-
referential circularity of observing will only lead to what Nikolas Luhmann characterized 
as “infinite regress” since one must always ask “for the reasons behind the reasons.”59
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As has been stated earlier, the general process of self-organization underlies the 
evolution of reality, including our mental activity.  The operations that we perform in 
constructing knowledge are isomorphic to the processes involved in self-organization.  It 
is essential to keep in mind this fundamental connection between the evolution of reality 
and the evolution of our thought for resolving the problem of objectivity.  The 
recognition of this connection leads to one important conclusion:  knowledge production 
involves active construction, not passive observing.
Since conservation and regulation are integral to the process of the self-
organization of reality, they are involved in every particular instance of this process.  
Therefore, in order to understand how a particular instance (object) of self-organization 
arises, it is important to identify the processes that are being conserved at this particular 
level of self-organization and the regulatory processes that are involved in their 
conservation.  Also, since the process of self-organization of reality maintains a constant 
equilibrium between equilibrium and disequilibrium, any particular instance of this 
process should be viewed in the context of such equilibrium, that is, as a critical juncture 
between the processes that are being equilibrated and the kind of disequilibria that this 
equilibration generates.  Observing these conditions is essential for establishing non-
classical objectivity of a description of reality.
We are only beginning to understand how reality organizes itself and how 
knowledge, which is one of the products of this self-organization, is constructed.  There 
is certainly much more to learn, and it is important to pursue this knowledge.  Only 
through an understanding of self-organization, objective knowledge of reality can be 
achieved:  that is, the kind of knowledge that fully integrates the knower into the process 
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of construction of knowledge, in contrast to classical knowledge where the knower is 
located on the transcendent plane and the foundational propositions, or axioms, on which 
knowledge is constructed lie outside the field of observing.
Our civilization has already entered a stage in its evolution when machines, 
computers, and robots largely free us from repetitive physical or metal labor and will 
probably completely replace humans in this capacity.  Increasingly, our civilization puts 
premium on the production of knowledge and the creation of new ideas.  How much 
more productive can we be if we control our own creativity?  If we are capable of 
avoiding futile conflicts, similar to the one which divided the two of the greatest minds of 
the 20th century and polarized the scientific community?  What could have resulted from 
their cooperation?  How many new ideas would have been born?  We will never know.  
An understanding of the process of construction will allow us to control better our 
own creativity.  By mastering this process we can learn to be creative when we want to, 
not only when we can.  We can make production of knowledge a much more efficient, 
more cooperative and more orderly process, rather than turn it into a largely futile and 
wasteful exercise of power.
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